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JOHN MARSHALL'S USE OF HISTORY
by
SISTER MARIE CAROLYN KLINKHAMER,

O.P., Ph.D.*

Nation-wide commemoration of the birth of such a man as John
Marshall offers many opportunities to evaluate his contributions to our
constitutional government. Among the tributes paid to the "Second Father
of the Constitution," to the "Great Expounder of the Constitution," it
would seem fitting to include some observations on his use of history.
The current of Marshall's thought has often been examined, and its depths
will undoubtedly be penetrated much further by reason of memorial programs, but for some reason unknown to those interested in historical
investigation Marshall's use of history has not been made the subject of
special research.
Some conjectures might be offered for this conspicuous gap in Marshall research, and among them might well be the comparatively late
appearance of any sort of historical investigation into the Supreme Court's
use of history. While this may be admitted as a partial cause, probably the
graver reason which will occur to those interested in Marshall is that he
has been charged with plagiarism and historical inaccuracy of the most
serious kind in his capacity as the historian or biographer of George
Washington, and in this bicentennial year it might seem more discreet
to overlook altogether any interest Marshall might have displayed in
history.'
I

Associate Professor of History, The Catholic University of America.
I The charges made against Marshall as an historian are included in W.A. Foran, "John
Marshall as a Historian," American Historical Review, XLIII (October 1937), 51-64.
Either Foran was unable to examine Marshall's letters to his publisher, C.P. Wayne, or he
did not believe that Marshall's comments upon the difficulties of historical composition
deserved credence. The former supposition seems more logical. Over a period of more
than two years Marshall sent frequent letters to Wayne; his comments upon his own
authorship will be noted below. The letters are in collections of the Historical Society
of Pennsylvania, but transcripts or photostatic copies of them are also to be found in the
Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. This depository contains
all the manuscript materials to be cited in this paper.

The redoubtable Chief Justice, however, would hardly have preferred this course of action himself, and some circumstances may even
be adduced in his defense before the use he made of history in his decisions
is examined. The Virginia-born jurist was much interested in history from
his early youth; he wrote Mr. Justice Story, concerning his own father,
that "He superintended my education, and gave me an early taste for
history and for poetry."2 As he grew older, these tastes matured, but did
not change, and Story wrote of his legal studies that he "seized, as it
were by intuition, the very spirit of juridical doctrines, though cased up
in the armor of centuries."' The armor would not, in fact, have been
anything more than an attractive container for such doctrines, to a man
of Marshall's temperament, ideally equipped as he was to note the passing
scene and compare it with what he knew from study or actual experience
in either remote or recent history. While he was Chief Justice, he wrote
to a friend that he could not be "inattentive to passing events, or an unconcerned observer of them."'
Even these slight testimonies should indicate that Marshall, who had
few books, and was never sure that reading many volumes was the best
way to secure an education,' was the kind of student who impressed what
he read deeply on his memory. He was, furthermore, well aware of the
many difficulties which attended his composition of the life of George
Washington, with which he was concerned during the first decade of the
nineteenth century. In his preface to the first volume of that work, later
issued separately as a colonial history, he wrote: "Our ideas of America,
of the character of our revolution, of those who engaged in it, and of the
struggles by which it was accomplished, would be imperfect without
some knowledge of our colonial history."' Yet he did not feel himself
equipped to undertake the investigations necessary to rewrite the entire
story of colonial settlement and growth in America, and he announced
that he would use accounts of facts "taken from the histories of the day,
and the authority relied on for the establishment of their verity has been
cited."" The chief ground for complaint against this system of Marshall's

2 John Marshall, An Autobiographical Sketch
(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1937), p. 4. Cf.
Joseph Story, An Address . . . on John Marshall (Rochester, New York, 1900), p. 9.
' Story, op. cit., p. 54.
4 John Marshall to R. Smith, 27 July 1812. Marshall Papers.
5 Marshall to Archibald Murphey, 6 October 1827. Marshall Papers.
6 John Marshall, A History of the Colonies Planted by the English (Philadelphia, 1824),
p. vi.
7 Ibid., The Life of George Washington, 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1805-1807), I, ix. Marshall
mentioned as his chief source letters to and from Washington; he wrote to Wayne concern-

is that he cited entirely too much from these accounts, failed to give due
or extended credit to their authors, and frequently-through the omission
of quotation marks-allowed whole paragraphs or even pages to appear
to be his own.
Such charges, made at the present time, appear graver than they
would have done in Marshall's day, when copyright piracy and less obvious
kinds of plagiarism were much more common than they are now. But a
word or two may be said in Marshall's defense, beyond entering this first
demurrer. While some historians of that period may have been using
far more extensive footnotes and citations, the common practice remained
what appears in Marshall's volumes for a very long period after this time,
and particularly was this true of works intended for the general public,
as was the case with Marshall's. It may also be noted that a man of Marshall's formidable memory might seek to be excused on the basis of his
having absorbed, almost unconsciously, many passages, and even lengthy
ones, from the works of others, especially when he was working so concentratedly as he did on the life of Washington. This latter excuse is not
mentioned as any chief argument, but simply as a circumstance which
ought to be entered into the record, in fairness to Marshall.
The chief argument, however, is that of the letters from Marshall
to his publisher, Caleb P. Wayne. They offer, among other things, a striking study in the relations between author and publisher, as these existed
a century and a half ago. They do not, it is true, rescue Marshall from some
imputations of carelessness, but they do tend, it is believed, to make
Wayne's part in the alleged plagiary much greater, and Marshall's part
much smaller. And it might be noted that before Marshall is accused of
incorrect or inadequate-or downright misleading-citations, the practice
of his publisher ought to be examined. Wayne's was faulty, but was Marshall therefore chargeable with fault?

ing the citation of the colonial histories he used: "I am a good deal puzzled to decide what
is to be done respecting the authorities quoted. There was some difficulty in fixing the
references because several pages successively are substantially taken from the same book. It
was my idea that the whole shoud [sic] be considered as refer'd to by placing the names of
the authors at the foot of the pages. I cannot now correct it as I have not the manuscript, and can only advise that the mark of reference be placed at the end of some paragraph,
as your judgment [sic] shall direct. . . . It will generally be right to place the letter of
reference at the close of the last paragraph." Marshall to Caleb P. Wayne, 22 January 1804,
Marshall Papers. It might be noted here that Marshall was never able to obtain proof
from Wayne, but had to correct the completely printed and published first edition
for re-printing as a second edition. Marshall to Wayne, 5 July 1804. Other letters bearing
on Marshall's trials with inaccurate copyists, inability to correct punctuation, spelling, usage,
etc., bear the dates: 22 January, 25 March, 27 March, 28 March, April, 17 May, 1 June,
6 June, 20 July, 10 August, 20 August, 3 September, 8 September, 4 October, 30 October,
1 December 1804; 19 February, 27 February, 16 March, 20 March, 29 June, 16 September,
and 5 October 1805. Some of these letters repeat, to Bushrod Washington, Marshall's
comment and directions to Wayne.

An examination of the Marshall letters still extant-their number
is unfortunately all too slight-discloses that Marshall was seriously
concerned over the lack of information which General Washington's
letters offered him as to details of the Revolution. Marshall wrote to
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in November 1802, that "there is much
information especially in relation to the war in the southern states, which
the papers do not communicate & which I have some hope of being able
to receive, at least in part, from you." He followed this request with a
detailed list of all the matters on which he desired information.8 Would
it be too much to suppose, especially in view of his own affirmation in the
preface to the Life, that he had followed the same procedure in writing to
other persons? Fortunately, we have a few other evidences that such
was his procedure.
In the meantime, however, he was plagued by his publisher for
chapters, or even whole volumes, until he had to write that his other
"indispensable avocations," including of course the Chief Justiceship,
made it impossible for him to write, revise, and superintend the copying
of his manuscript any more rapidly than he was doing.' Not long after
he sent out this epistle he addressed another to Wayne, charging him particularly to look out for all stylistic matters, to revise his spelling so that
it would conform to the usage of Johnson's Dictionary, and expressing
keen mortification over his failure to be consistent in spelling such American names as Chesapeake. ° Insisting on these same matters in his next
letter, he also declared that "In a history of military transactions, plans
or cutts are of vast importance. Those preserved by General Washington
are not all that should be inserted in the work."" A few days later he
wrote that he thought "the dates must be
inserted. The mind is not satisfied
12
without an exact knowledge of dates."'
At virtually this same time, he was writing to Washington's nephew,
Bushrod, that he did not mind at all the corrections of friends, which he
would not rank with the "bitter sarcasms of a foe," nor would he "feel
either wounded or chagrined at inattentions and inaccuracies being pointed
out by another."' 8 He rebuked, in a somewhat oblique manner, the fears
of his publisher over the employment of one Stedman as a draughtsman,
declaring that his British citizenship should constitute no objection to his
employment if he possessed the means of information required for the

Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 21 November 1802. Pinckney Papers.
9Marshall to Wayne, 23 December 1803.
10 Ibid., 10 January 1804.
11 Ibid., 22 January 1804.
12 Ibid., 7 February 1804.
Is Marshall to Bushrod Washington, April 1804.
8

job then in hand." He objected to Wayne's correction of his proofs, when
he had used the word enemy, pointing out that "A historian, it is true,
is of no nation, but the person whose history he writes is, and the word
[enemy] is used to denote, not the enemy of the author, but of the person
or army whose actions the historian is relating."' " These attitudes would
seem to be those of the real historian, however imperfectly trained he
might have been by twentieth-century standards. But Marshall several
times informed Wayne, in addition to these instructions, that he expected
him to see to the "pointing," that is, the punctuation, of his manuscript,
and told him, also, what works would be valuable as supplying background or additional information, at the same time that he continued his
protests against the unconscionable hurry he was being asked to make, to
complete the volumes in the time specified by the publisher. It should
hardly seem too strange, then, that Marshall was never satisfied with them,
and that even in their revised version he noted that the inaccuracies and
deficiencies of the first and second editions-he objected especially to the
way the second edition had been hurried into print, in such fashion that it
had inhibited the sales of the first edition-had not been corrected to
his satisfaction.'"
The judgment that Marshall was not an historian of the first rank
may certainly be concurred in today, as may also the description of his
work as not truly Federalist. That Marshall was early, however, and
always remained an assiduous observer and student of history is far more
true, and it is this facet of Marshall's intellectual attainments which
deserves much more attention than it has ever received. The circumstances
of his early life were naturally conducive to an interest in political affairs,
but it is surely obvious that in the history of this country many young men
had performed military service during the Revolution who did not remain17
interested in their later lives in the causes and results of such conflicts.
After his retirement from actual hostilities, in 1779, when there were
more officers than men available for his contingent, Marshall almost
immediately became involved in local and state politics in Virginia, and
thus had excellent opportunity to rekindle his historical consciousness.

Marshall to Wayne, 6 June 1804.
15 Ibid., 10 August 1804.
16 Ibid., 5 July, 20 July, 10 August 1804. On September 3, Marshall wrote: "I had to
learn that under the pressure of constant application the spring of the mind loses its
elasticity & that the style will be insensibly influenced by that of the authors we have been
perusing."
17 Marshall's correspondence with Timothy Pickering is a particularly delightful record of
the attitudes of two Revolutionary War figures whose historical interests were always fresh
and vigorous. Transcripts of these letters, too, are to be found in the Marshall Papers. The
originals are in the care of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
14

As a member of the Virginia convention called to vote on ratification
of the Constitution, Marshall likewise distinguished himself with his
strong advocacy of the new instrument of government, and with his
keen sense of what the recent Constitutional Convention had meant to do.
From this time, when the few Marshall letters begin to be found in some
quantity, and from the appearance of the opinions delivered by Marshall
as Chief Justice, his historical consciousness may be noted as one of the
really cogent aspects of his personality.
As a delegate to France and the chief figure for the new United States
in the X.Y.Z. affair, for example, Marshall wrote lengthy letters to George
Washington, with the avowed object of giving him reports which should
not be official, but merely informative. Washington, Marshall believed,
would already have been consulted by President Adams concerning all
of the official activities and reports, and the letters Marshall sent should be
viewed as merely additional to them. This explanation, offered by Marshall
himself, throws into higher relief his keen sense of the historical, when he
makes extended reference to the background and current prospects of each
of the several countries he visited while abroad on this mission.
Marshall was aware, for example, of the importance of the events
of the later days of the French Revolution, and chronicled faithfully the
rumors concerning the downfall of Lazare Carnot, together with the
results which he expected to flow therefrom. As a matter of particular
significance, in view of his own later position, Marshall's fears for the
French people because of their disregard for their constitution, are well
worth noting.'8 Arrived in Paris, Marshall continued his vivid account
of current events, which he viewed as important history being made. 9 He
wrote in much the same manner to Washington again in the following
spring, and to Timothy Pickering during the late summer. These letters
contained penetrating observations on the French, together with equally
acute ones on the Swiss and their form of government."0 When it is
remembered that Marshall was, all during this time, engaged in negotiating with Talleyrand and his associates, coping with Elbridge Gerry's
anomalous conduct, trying to arrange with Pinckney how to accommodate the latter's family in France when the remainder of the embassy
should depart, and maintaining his own reputation as a man of sensibility
and good taste, the long letters dispatched to such friends as Washington
and Pickering appear all the more valuable as containing the considered
historical and political judgments of an acute observer.
18 Marshall to George Washington, 15 September 1797. Original in the Jared Sparks Collection, Massachusetts Historical Society.
19 Ibid., 24 October 1797.
20Ibid., 8 March 1798; Marshall to Pickering, 11 August 1798.

If Marshall's faults as an historian are to be noted, perhaps his letter
to Charles Dabney, written in 1800, should be instanced, for here Marshall
indulged in that most dangerous of occupations for the votary of Clio-speculating about the future. He wrote first about the crisis in government as he saw it then, but commented that higher taxes would be necessary because of the increasing population of the United States, and added
that he envisaged a wealthier, stronger America in twenty years."' It may
be added immediately that most of Marshall's later historical comments
fall into the more conventional pattern of "viewing with alarm." By the
late summer of the same year, he was compelled to write in the more
usual pattern, "There is a tide in the affairs of nations, of2 2parties, and of
individuals. I fear that of real Americanism is on the ebb.1
A more accurate, and less romantic, attitude was expressed in a letter
written some years later to Marshall's old associate, Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney. In this letter, Marshall summed up the recent history of continental European nations, and drew a conclusion which he applied forcibly
to the United States:
If we are, like Spain under her imbecile administration which was entirely
devoted to France, to be whipped into a war when a master requires it; or if,
disregarding our best interests, we are at the order of a foreign power to enter
into the system of commercial warfare against England which Bonaparte has
planned, the success2 3 of which infallibly involves our own ruin, we are no
longer independent.

In this passage Marshall not only applied the recent history of the European nations to the American situation; he indicated, also, the state of
mind which his fellow-Virginian, Jefferson, found not only suspicious
but abhorrent. Yet it could hardly be denied that Marshall's evaluation
of the factors involved in this equation was sound.
A few years later, he displayed the same perspicacious grasp of matters historical, when he wrote to Robert Goodloe Harper, to congratulate
him on his oration concerning the Russian victories over France. Marshall
then remarked, "The policy of the world would certainly require that Russia should not be permitted to extend herself further-especially toward
the center of Europe. 21 4 It seems hardly necessary to stress the sound historical and political judgment displayed here, or to note the consequences
which would have followed had Marshall's counsel been heeded.

21 Marshall to Charles Dabney, 20 January 1800. Dabney Papers.
22

Marshall to Harrison Gray Otis, 8 August 1800.

23 Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 21 September 1808. Pinckney Papers.
24

Marshall to Harper, 22 November 1813.

His letter to Harper commented at some length on recent continental
happenings, but with special reference to older historical events:
France within her antient [sic] limits was the terror and justly the terror
of Europe. A vigorous government was at any time capable of extending her
powers over her neighbors, and a combination of great potentates was necessary to restrain her within her legitimate bounds. How much more dangerous
must she become with an additional population of at least six million inhabiting a territory whose natural advantages are immense.

Chiding Harper for his suggestion that this state of affairs should be
restored, Marshall observed sorrowfully, "But this increased ability to
conquer you would give her in order to save Europe from Russia." The
proper area to be strengthened, Marshall thought, in terms strikingly
similar to those of proposals made in our own day, was farther to the east.
"But if augmentation of power must be given to any state for the purpose
of forming a barrier against Russia, it is to Austria not to France that this
augmentation may be trusted with safety."2
It is extremely unfortunate that a far larger body of John Marshall's
letters have never been recovered, despite the most diligent search, for, if
these samples are truly representative of Marshall's comments on European historical events and politics, his contemporaries and later generations
could have learned much from him. For the same reason, but with added
poignancy, the loss of his letters containing observations on American
history and politics must be mourned. When he did cite history, in the
few letters we have, he did so with a trenchancy and incisiveness which
must have been as gratifying to his admirers as dismaying to his opponents. One such example, to be found in a leter to his beleaguered friend,
Samuel Chase, whose impeachment was widely heralded as the prelude
to Marshall's own arraignment, records an interesting bit of legal, or
common law history:
According to the ancient doctrine, a judge finding a verdict against the law
of the case was liable to an attaint, and this account of the present doctrine
seems to be that a judge giving a legal
26 opinion contrary to the opinion of the
legislature is liable to impeachment.

This dry observation was, of course, far below the standard of invective set
by Chase in the controversy he was then waging with the Federalists, but
Marshall could never be brought to the use of more intemperate language
-- at least in his written utterances, and there is no record that his spoken
ones were much different, except as to formality-and he was perhaps
here merely giving Chase more solid ammunition from the arsenal of
history than that learned gentleman was wont to use.

25
26

Ibid.
Marshall to Samuel Chase, 23 January 1804.

In his private life, Marshall maintained his interest in history, and
accepted, with grave decorum, an invitation from the Massachusetts Historical Society to become a member of that group in 1809-although he
later confessed to Story that he had lost all memory of this membership
through lack of activity in its behalf. 7 The historical observations of
Marshall's later life were made, as might have been expected, to his friend
Justice Story. Aside from the likenesses so often the subject of comment
when these two men have been considered as jurists, they seem to have
been very much in sympathy on the subject of history, and Marshall
remarked, with some frequency, and much thoughtfulness, on historical
incidents when he was writing to Story.
One of the lengthier such letters was occasioned by Story's having
given a discourse commemorating the bicentennial of the founding of
Salem. He had sent Marshall a copy of this address, and Marshall, in
thanking him for it and remarking quizzically that Mrs. Marshall's admiration of it had almost excited his jealousy, went on to comment:
You have drawn a vivid portrait, and I believe a faithful likeness of those
extraordinary men who first peopled New England, and my feelings as well
as my judgement have accompanied you in your rapid sketch of the character
and conduct of their descendants. I wish the admonitory part may have full
Some
effect on others as well as on those to whom it is particularly addressed.
28
of our southern friends might benefit from the lesson it inculcates.

Since this letter was written in 1828, it is not difficult to deduce the
identity of the southern friends to whom Marshall was alluding. Neither
is it difficult to note that he was here drawing a parallel between historical
events and current ones, while not avoiding completely the temptation to
moralize which so often has made historical study an object of suspicion or
distaste. His observation, however, was far more acceptable in his own
day than it would be if made now, and in any case its justice can hardly
be gainsaid.
In his last years, as has been noted on several occasions by all the
writers on Marshall's life, he yielded to Story's persuasions that he write
out a sketch of his own life; this is surely a kind of amateur exercise in
history, as was his reply to J.K. Paulding, who had asked him for information concerning his appointment to the commission to France at the time
of the X.Y.Z. affair. His answer to Paulding explained that he had been
requested by Washington himself to undertake this task, although Adams
was then the president, but Marshall always contended that earlier essays
into public life had not attracted the attention of Washington, in spite of

27

Marshall to Massachusetts Historical Society, 20 September 1809.

28 Marshall to Joseph Story, 29 October 1828.

the claims Marshall's friends made to his having had the special notice
and favor of the first president."
Fragmentary as such notices of Marshall's historical interest must
necessarily be, they may be supplemented-or perhaps it would be more
nearly accurate to say that they may supplement-what he used of history
as Chief Justice in framing and handing down his celebrated decisions.
When his opinions are examined, it may be seen that they differ markedly
from those of his successors, and this, of course, largely because he had to
furnish the framework on which they would erect their more showy edifices. So much praise has been lavished on Marshall's opinions, and so
much sober judgment has been expended upon their merits and demerits,
that even a rehearsal of these comments is surely superfluous. What has
been neglected, it would seem, is a special examination of the extent to
which these opinions were assisted, or clarified, by resort to historical and
political information, with which the foregoing paragraphs have demonstrated that Marshall was thoroughly conversant. This is all the more
surprising in view of what may be regarded as a generally acceptable
evaluation:
Many of the greatest and most luminous of his constitutional opinions contain
scarcely a reference to adjudged cases or to the authority of precedents, for
there were none, and 3 0the conclusions reached do not depend upon technical
learning or discussion.

While it has frequently been stated that Marshall owed much to a knowledge of the law gained almost entirely through private study-the six
weeks' lecture course of George Wythe could hardly have been more than
an incentive to individual effort-and to a knowledge of political theory
secured through the same means, and through exposure to the instructions
of his father, and of the two clergymen to whom he was sent for some
tutelage during his boyhood, no one has thought to look through the
opinions to see how heavily Marshall may have relied upon history also
to make his notable contribution to our system. Such an attempt should
prove interesting, though no claims are made that it will show Marshall
to have been an historicist, or one slavishly bound to follow established
legal precedents. On the contrary, where he has been found to have used
history, Marshall used it to illuminate a point he had already made through
some other fashion, or to make more cogent an argument already pre-

29 Marshall to Paulding, 4 April 1835.
0John M. Dillon, editor, John Marshall: Complete Constitutional Decisions (Chicago,
1903.), pp. iv-v.

sented. And this was quite as it should have been, and as it would have
seemed to Marshall that it must be. History was a handmaiden of the law,
not a despotic mistress.
In his very first celebrated constitutional decision, in Marbury v.
Madison, Marshall referred briefly to the history of British law, as exemplifying the care government should take to protect individuals who
claimed to have suffered injuries." The reference was a passing one, and
obviously not one intended by Marshall to do more than shed light on
the point he wished to make-an anti-Jeffersonian point, his contemporaries knew-but it is interesting as giving a glimpse into the methods
employed by Marshall in supplying for the deficiencies in a judicial system
within the common law which had as yet no established precedents.
When he came to consider the involved questions arising out of the
Aaron Burr conspiracy, Marshall refered to later history, and that with
which he was more immediately familiar. The case of Bollman and
Swartwout is a famous one, containing Marshall's lengthy, and for long
controlling, definition of treason. In the course of his remarks, Marshall
referred to the circumstances under which the first Congress had included
in its initial legislation an act respecting the issuance of writs of habeas
corpus. "Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction [in the
Constitution]," he observed, "they must have felt, with peculiar force,
the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity.""2 The Chief Justice's
statement here is as interesting for what it concealed-his own first-hand
recollection of the precarious condition of the new government-as for
what it recalled of the historical circumstances under which the first Congress acted.
When he considered the situation of Aaron Burr himself, as a circuit
judge, Marshall went back further into the history of the meaning of
treason, and declared:
It is used in a very old statute of that country, whose language is our language,
and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable
that the term was not employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense

which had been affixed to

it

8
by those from whom they borrowed it.
3

1 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
Cranch 75, 95 (1807).

824

88 United States v. Aaron Burr, 4 Cranch 469, 470 (1807).

His historical citation here was argumentative as well as illustrative, but
a little later in the same case he reverted to his more usual use of history
when he said:
[

.nthe
law [regarding principals and accessories in treason] is otherwise
han in felonies] because the theatre of action is more extensive.
This reasoning applies in England as strongly as in the United States.
While in '15 and '45 the family of Stuart sought to regain the crown they
had forfeited, the struggle was for the whole kingdom; yet no man was ever
considered as legally present at one place, when actually at 3another;
or as
4
aiding in one transaction, while actually employed in another.
.

It would be too much to claim that the case of Aaron Burr was decided
through the use of history exclusively, but surely Marshall's citations of
it were intended to occupy a position other than that accorded to legal
precedents properly so called.
Marshall used his knowledge of English law again in the case of the
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux et al., when he referred to corporations as taxable under construction of statutes of Henry VIII, as well as
under the opinions of Coke, and of Mansfield."3 He followed a similar
course of historical reasoning in Fletcher v, Peck, when he reviewed the
entire history of grants of land in America from the reign of Charles II
to 1763."6 Neither of these uses was essential to the decision in the case,
but it may be said that each was integral.
A little later-and it may be interjected here that Marshall's use of
history was not continuous, but rather occasional-the Chief Justice had
occasion to pronounce upon the vexatious subject of the validity of paper
money when he was actually concerned with the somewhat larger problem
of the obligation of contracts. Marshall's own words are interesting, once
again, as showing his method as well as his reason for using history:
Every state in the Union, both while a colony and after becoming independent,
had been in the practice of issuing paper money. . . . We are told [that the
laws] were such as grew out of the general distress following the war in
which our independence was established. To relieve this distress, paper money
was issued, worthless lands, and other property of no use to the creditor,
were made a tender in payment of debts; and the time of payment, stipulated
in the contract, was extended by law. These were the peculiar evils of the day. 87

The entire early nineteenth-century attitude toward history is here exemplified, as well as Marshall's own settled practice of referring to events

84 Ibid., 494.

11 5 Cranch 61, 88-90 (1809).
8 6 Cranch 87, 140-142 (1810).
" Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton 122, 203-204 (1819).

in which he had himself participated as though they could be known only
from other authorities. There is here, perhaps, the jurist's insistence on
the line of demarcation between evidence and hearsay testimony.
In another of his most celebrated cases, M'Culloch v. Maryland,
Marshall invoked history to clarify the legal complexities surrounding
the existence and conduct of the second Bank of the United States. The
institution itself was one in which he had some slight interest, 8 but again
this interest was not allowed to appear. Whether Congress had power to
incorporate a bank, rather, was the question which prompted him to refer
to some historical circumstances. The legal and legislative history of the
young United States was first mentioned, as authorizing the activities of
the Bank, and then Marshall went back a little further into the Constitutional Convention itself, and reviewed its history. After examining this at
some length, he came to a conclusion based on his historical investigation
and judgment, which is pregnant controversy: the people of the new
United States had formed a new entity in establishing the national government, inasmuch as the powers conferred by the people on the state governments were different from those conferred on the national government."9
It is hardly surprising that Jefferson and his associates looked upon Marshall with suspicion, or that his fame remained limited before the Civil
War. The whole problem of the location and use of sovereignty was
here settled, to Marshall's satisfaction, by recourse to the workings of the
Constitutional Convention-to which Jefferson was not a delegate, and
at which his later ally, Madison, was a Federalist.
This approach of Marshall's to a question already vital, and to
become viciously divisive, was not limited to this one ca~e. Writing in
Cohens v. Virginia,two years later, the Chief Justice averred:
There is certainly nothing in the circumstances under which our constitution
was formed; nothing in the history of the times, which would justify the
opinion that the confidence reposed in the states was so implicit as to leave
to them and their tribunals the power of resisting or defeating, in the form
of law, the legitimate measures of the Union.

There is a certain poignance in this statement, following as it does on
Marshall's remark that "We have no assurance that we shall be less
divided than we have been."" ° He recalled, in the same case, that the
historical record showed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
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that all the states were greatly indebted, "and the apprehension that these
debts might be prosecuted in the federal courts, formed a very serious
objection to that instrument."'" For this reason, the matter of concurrent
jurisdiction of state and federal courts deserved some mention, and on that
matter Marshall felt that the opinion of the Federalistshould be taken as
having great authority. As he phrased it, "Great weight has always been
attached and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition." '
This weight did not, of course, decide the case, but it assisted in making
Marshall's disposition of it intelligible.
The Chief Justice's celebrated definition of commerce, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, was likewise indebted to his insistence on referring to the contemporary record.4" More extended use of history was likewise to appear in
that case, when Marshall reviewed the history of the days of the Embargo
-a commercial, not a war measure, he explained, "opposed, in a part of
our country which supposed its interests to be vitally affected by the act."44
Again this history was not essential to the decision, but its worth in delimiting both the term commerce and the Congressional power to legislate
thereon was great.
Commerce, and the inequalities between the states during the Confederation period, were likewise subjected to historical analysis and comment in Brown v. Maryland.4" Marshall showed, by these means, that the
commerce clause of the Constitution had been intended by its framers to
eliminate the "oppressed and degraded state" into which commerce had
fallen.4" When he came to consider contracts in the case of Ogden v.
Saunders, Marshall went back into history even further. Although this
was rather legal history in a narrower sense than that just noted, Marshall's
approach is again the chief matter of interest:
So far back as human research carries us, we find the judicial power, as a
part of the executive, administering justice by the application of remedies to
violated rights, or broken contracts ....
the proceedings evince
the idea of
47
a pre-existing intrinsic obligation which human law enforces.

Inasmuch as this historical appeal is used to buttress an excursion into
political philosophy, and that both were employed to underline the obligation of contracts, the importance of Marshall's approach seems obvious.
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But Marshall was not content to cite only such history as that just
mentioned. He referred, in this same case, to the personal histories of
the framers of the Constitution, and ventured to suppose that they were
"intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned men
whose treatises on the law of nature and nations" had delineated the subjects of obligation and contract.4" Developing this idea, Marshall came
down to the history with which he was himself familiar, and recorded
what were probably his own reactions to the Convention, an "august
spectacle" of the "assemblage of a whole people," through their representatives. The stress on the concept of the whole people is signficant not only
of the tense period in which Marshall was writing, but also of the importance he attached to this concept.
The one other case of similar nature to those just mentioned in which
Marshall used history was that of Craig v. Missouri. Reviewing the history
of paper money, Marshall here cited at considerable length Hutchinson's
History of Massachusetts, and endeavored to discover, from the history
of this country, whether the evils of paper money were attributable solely
to its having been made legal tender.4" That his conclusions from this
procedure were in the negative is additional proof of the significance which
he attached to history when he used it. It must be borne in mind, however, that there are many gaps in his employment of this procedure, and
it may be conjectured that Marshall's use of history is too intermittent
to prove that he had any special attitude toward it.
If this conjecture were to be accepted as proven, it would be necessary to ignore Marshall's attitude in the last great cases of his career. In
American Insurance Company v. Canter,for instance, he referred to universal historical testimony as showing that the holding of conquered
territory was only military occupation until the conclusion of a peace
treaty.5" In the same year, he exchanged letters with Colonel Timothy
Pickering on the subject of the placement of the semi-colon in the taxing
clause of the Constitution, and agreed with that gentleman that historical
evidence that it did not appear in the original document, nor in the first
printed copies of it, should have great weight in the decision of tax cases."1
His letter to Justice Story,52 contained, however, the longest private record
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extant of his attitude toward episodes in our history which were to provoke
from him his longest historical animadversions for the bench.
In his letter to Story, Marshall remarked with great feeling on the treatment which the Indians had received at the hands of the whites. Marshall's words were not intemperate; they exhibit, rather, a considerable
measure of historical judgment:
The conduct of our Fore Fathers in expelling the original occupants of the
soil grew out of so many mixed motives that any censure which philanthropy
may bestow upon it ought to be qualified. The Indians were a fierce and
dangerous enemy, whose love of war made them sometimes the aggressors,
whose numbers and habits then made them formidable, and whose cruel system
of warfare seemed to justify any endeavour to remove them to a distance from
civilized settlements. It was not until after the adoption of our present government that respect for our own safety permitted us to give full indulgence
to those principles of humanity and justice which ought always to govern
our conduct toward the aborigines when this course53can be pursued without
exposing ourselves to the most afflicting calamities.

Yet, Marshall continued,
I often think, with indignation, on our disreputable conduct (as I think it is)
in the affair of the Creeks of Georgia; and I look
54 with some alarm on the
course [we are] now pursuing in the Northwest.

These statements may be noted as in the best tradition of the early
nineteenth-century historian, of the trained observer of historical events
who can legitimately prophesy about future contingencies, and as foreshadowing the decisions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v.
Georgia. In each of these, Marshall referred to the history of the
Cherokees,
a people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our
ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain,
gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts, and our arms, 55

and lamented that at the time of the formation of the Constitution, its
framers had knowledge of only such Indian history as would show the
red men appealing either to the tomahawk or to the government. It was
this circumstance, Marshall was certain, which prevented the framers from
including in the Constitution any provision which would make the courts
of the United States available to the Indians. "6
In Worcester v. Georgia,Marshall went into far greater detail. After
referring to the history of the Indian tribes themselves, and pointing out
how many ages had gone by before these tribes and their land had become
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known to European travellers," Marshall asked what was the legal and
historical status of the latter.
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on

it, acquire for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom
they were commissioned, a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to
the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it?
Or has nature, or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over
hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and manufacturers?

Answering his own question, and again appealing to history, Marshall
went on:
But power, war, conquest, give rights which, after possession, are conceded by
the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they
descend. We proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at
their origin; because 58holding it in our recollection might shed some light on
existing pretensions.

The light Marshall sought here was to be found, if his procedure
gives any indication of what he believed, in an exhaustive examination of
the behavior of European governments toward their colonies in North
America, and in the behavior particularly of the British crown. Pages
were devoted to this examination, and particularly to the consideration
of the eighteenth-century history of the British colonies. The king, it was
pointedly declared, had never interfered with the internal affairs of the
Indians, but had contented himself with treaties of alliance and subsidies. "
The government of the United States had inherited this tradition, and its
treaties were then mentioned as giving historical evidence of the same
attitude as that of the British.6" Once again the motives underlying the
summoning and activity of the Constitutional Convention were reviewed.6'
Finally, history was called upon to witness to "the actual state of things
0 2 and Marshall proceeded to make
at this time,""
his vain, but immortal
order to Georgia to release Worcester.
In view of the circumstances of this case, it is not at all to be wondered at that Marshall should, the same year as the decision just reviewed,
have written Story to declare that he shared the latter's gloom over the
prospects of the country. Marshall's reflections were those of an old man,
now historic in himself, and still pondering upon the lessons of history
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and politics which he had so early learned. He wondered, if Story felt
such gloom, how he would expect a man to feel
whose geographical position enables him to see a great deal that is concealed
from you? I yield slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that our constitution
can not last. I had supposed that north of the Potowmack a firm and solid
government, competent to the security of national liberty, might be preserved.
Even that now seems doubtful. The case of the south seems to me desperate;
as opinions are incompatible with a united government even among ourselves.
63
The union has been prolonged thus far by miracles; they cannot continue.

He feared for the judiciary, as he had earlier remarked to another correspondent, lest it be "prostrated before opinions which are becoming every
day more popular--at least in the south."64 Though less obviously historical judgments than others which have been cited from his decisions,
these remarks are important as showing what was in Marshall's mind as he
rendered those decisions, and also to what extent he was using his historical
knowledge to inform his judicial pronouncements. The conclusion seems
inescapable that there was much interdependence.
In the last great case of his career, Barron v. Baltimore, Marshall
once more reverted to what had become a favorite theme: the circumstances surrounding the declaration of freedom from British domination,
and leading to the adoption of the Constitution. Emphasizing his contention that the new government was framed by the people for themselves,
and not for the government of the individual states, he appealed to the
"history of the Day" to establish his contention that this new situation
had not been brought about with complete unanimity and freedom from
discord. This was the historical reason for the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, and Marshall was convinced that this reason should be a part of
the record when the application of the amendments was in question.
"These amendments," he asserted, "demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of6 the General Government, not against those of
the local governments.'' 5
If there is something ironic in noticing that Marshall's last appeal to
history was against the nationalizing tendency which all his opinions are
supposed to display, it may be said that Marshall's own feeling for the
testimony of history would hardly disapprove. The evidence of this sort
of witness was to be listened to, when occasion indicated that it should
be, with all the greater attention and credence because she would bring
forward only facts to which all might equally have recourse. Any naivete
in this view of Marshall's was more than matched by that of his contem-

68 Marshall to Story, 22 September 1832.
64 Marshall to Joseph Hopkins, 17 December 1830.
65 7 Peters 243 (1833).

poraries. As to his use of history in general, it may be noted that where
he mentioned his sources, they were the best available; where he used
history without citation, his facts are not to be controverted; where he drew
lessons from history, he was acting in the spirit of his age, and certainly
not contrary to the pattern of the prudent man; where his decisions relied
heavily upon history, they were not bound by them in any non-legal sense.
One thing more may be added: in giving the Court so many examples
of the way in which it might proceed, in setting a pattern of precedents,
it is not too much to claim that Marshall's use of history, particularly the
history of his own country, kept before his contemporaries and his successors an awareness of the existence of a beacon frequently to be relied upon
in sighting the Constitution.

